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Introduction 
This survey paper will critically discuss four different strategies to 
explain our knowledge of mathematics. In the first section I will outline 
Benacerraf ’s dilemma as put forth in Benacerraf ’s famous paper 
“Mathematical Truth”1 – 
a dilemma faced by any account of mathematical knowledge. The 
aim of this section is to clarify and discuss the semantic and epistemic 
constraints that Benacerraf (explicitly and implicitly) imposes, and show 
how they give rise to his well-known dilemma. In the second section I 
will review four strategies to overcome this dilemma as they occur in 
the philosophical literature. The first two platonistic strategies comply 
with the semantic constraint but, I will argue, provide insufficient 
answers to the epistemic constraint, while the other two, nominalistic 
strategies either reject the idea of mathematical knowledge altogether or 
fail the semantic constraint. In the last section, I will elicit, on the basis 
of my discussion of the four conceptions, what I label the fundamental 
assumption. I will argue that it is presupposed by all four strategies and 
suggest that a rejection of this assumption will give rise to a different type 
of platonistic response. A thorough discussion of this fifth alternative 
will, however, be postponed to another occasion. 
1 Benacerraf ’s dilemma 
In his seminal paper “Mathematical Truth”2 Benacerraf outlines a 
dilemma that every account within the philosophy of mathematics faces. 
The dilemma arises from the need for any such conception to satisfy 
two constraints whose mutual resolution, however, seems impossible. 
The first constraint concerns the semantic theory adopted for our 
mathematical discourse. Here the demand is to have a “homogenous 
semantical theory in which the semantics for the statements parallel the 
semantics for the rest of the language.” (p.403)
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The second constraint is epistemological in nature and demands that “the 
account of mathematical truth mesh with a reasonable epistemology.” 
(p.403) Benacerraf ’s dilemma, in its simplest form, arises when one 
attempts to conform to those two constraints by appeal to the prevalent 
views in semantics and epistemology: The standard view to comply with 
the first constraint – a Tarskian theory of truth – imposes an ontology 
which is incompatible with the standard view in epistemology, which, 
at the time of Benacerraf ’s publication3 , comprised causal constraints 
on knowledge of any type of ob ject. In order to explain the dilemma and 
the resulting challenge more clearly, I will have a closer look at the two 
main constraints which each involve two components. 
“Another way of putting this first requirement is to demand that 
any theory of mathematical truth be in conformity with a general 
theory of truth – a theory of truth theories, if you like, – which 
certifies that the property of sentences that the account calls 
“truth” is indeed truth. This, it seems to me, can be done only 
on the basis of some general theory for at least the language as 
a whole.” (p. 408, my italics)
The only candidate to satisfy this demand is, according to Benacerraf, a 
Tarskian account of truth, where truth is spelled out by appeal to reference 
and satisfaction. Here, the basic idea is to assign semantic values to the 
different semantic components of a sentence and to then correlate the 
truth or falsity of a sentence with those semantic values.6 
The second requirement of the semantic constraint adopted by Benac- 
erraf is to take the surface grammar of sentences of the discourse at face 
value. Consider his two examples:
1. There are at least three large cities older than New York.
2. There are at least three perfect numbers greater than 1.
If we take the surface grammar at face value we should regard both 
sentences as having the same structure, namely: 
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Benacerraf reinforces this second requirement when he writes that “we 
should not be satisfied with an account that fails to treat (1) and (2) in 
parallel fashion, on the model of (3).” (p. 408) Hence, in addition to 
adopting a Tarskian – referential – theory of truth, the semantic constraint 
also involves the demand to respect the surface grammar and hence to 
take it without further qualification that what seem to be singular terms, 
such as “New York” and “17”, are singular terms.
To sum up, the semantic constraint demands a general and systematic 
theory of truth to be applied to the mathematical language; and it also 
demands that we respect the surface-grammar of the mathematical 
discourse in so applying our theory of truth. Consequently, the standard 
view which satisfies these demands does interpret mathematics by 
analogy with empirical sentences. Both are analysed using predicates, 
quantifiers and singular terms and satisfaction-conditions for truth. 
Crucially, in the case of mathematics, number-terms are regarded as 
singular terms and as such are required to denote ob jects. In addition, 
the ob jects that number-terms refer to are intuitively regarded as non-
spatio-temporally located and are thus abstract. The resulting position 
– the standard view – is one which genuinely deserves the label 
‘platonistic’, as Benacerraf notes.
The merit of the standard view for the semantic constraint is, according 
to Benacerraf, that the semantics of mathematics nicely meshes with 
that of other discourses. Consequently, mixed discourses – where 
mathematical and empirical terms are used in the same context – pose 
no additional problem. Further to these virtues of parsimony and 
simplicity, Benacerraf notes that a Tarskian theory of truth “is the only 
viable systematic general account we have of truth” in order to account 
for the first requirement. Finally, note that taking the surface-grammar 
at face value keeps the truth-conditions of mathematical discourse in 
line with the thoughts intuitively expressed by such sentences. Hence, 
respecting the surface-grammar guarantees that what seems to be the 
sub ject of our mathematical discourse is its sub ject and thus what 
seems to be known and thought about by the sub ject is what is known 
and thought about by the subject.
Let us now turn to the second epistemological constraint proposed by 
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Benacerraf. At first sight, it merely comprises a minimal assumption that 
hardly seems controversial: we have mathematical knowledge, which 
“is no less knowledge for being mathematical” (p.409). Subsequently, the 
demand of the second constraint is just that the account of mathematical 
truth be compatible with an account of knowledge that renders such 
truths knowable. 
According to Benacerraf, the standard way of complying with this second 
constraint, and the only viable general account of knowledge, is a causal 
account. The idea, roughly, is that for a sub ject X to know that p, there 
has to obtain some type of causal relation between the sub ject X and the 
ob jects, or other items, involved in the sub ject matter of p. This account 
can be easily motivated by appeal to our knowledge of medium-sized, 
everyday ob jects, which does seem to involve causal relations. 
However, adopting the standard view – a Tarskian theory of truth – 
to comply with the semantic constraint and adopting the standard way 
– causal theory of knowledge – to comply with the epistemological 
constraint seems to lead to an impasse, and brings Benacerraf ’s dilemma 
to the fore: If the truth-conditions of mathematical statements are given 
by the standard semantical account, then an arithmetical statement 
involving number terms should be regarded as making reference to 
numbers as ob jects that exist in an abstract realm. However, these ob 
jects seem unaccountable within the standard view in epistemology, 
as clearly no causal connection between an object of this sort and the 
presumably knowing sub ject can be made out. Thus, no explanation of 
how we can come to know that the truth-conditions of a mathematical 
statement obtain can be offered. Crucially, note that what Benacerraf 
outlines is a genuine dilemma in that either of the two constraints (or 
even both) can be relaxed – either of the two standard views can be 
dismissed and a new theory of truth or new epistemology can be put 
into its place. It is not a direct attack (as often thought to be) on the 
platonistic view of semantics. 
Before I outline various general strategies for resolving the dilemma, I 
will briefly consider a misled interpretation of the epistemological 
constraint. This will lead to a strengthening of the simple version of the 
dilemma. 
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It would be an inadequate platonist response to the dilemma to merely 
reject the causal conception of knowledge in the light of recent criticisms. 
Certainly, the causal conception of knowledge does not always seem 
adequate for medium sized ob jects which provided its initial motivation, 
nor is it prima facie compatible with knowledge of the future or even 
facts that can be construed as involving arguably less suspect abstract 
ob jects such as the University of St Andrews, Dundee United F.C. or 
Apple Computers. Thus, so the platonist could argue, the causal theory 
of knowledge should not be adopted, since it clearly fails to be a simple 
and general account of knowledge that would qualify as the “only viable 
systematic general account we have of” knowledge. Consequently, 
Benacerraf ’s dilemma would vanish in its initial form since there are no 
fully general causal constraints on knowledge. 
Although I am in general sympathetic to the idea that the causal theory 
of knowledge is insufficient as an account of our knowledge in general, 
this response, however, misses the crucial point of Benacerraf ’s dilemma. 
The dilemma, in its strongest form, not only points to an incompatibility 
between two standard views within two areas in the philosophy of 
mathematics: it also aims to highlight an integration problem in the 
philosophy of mathematics. Accordingly, the epistemological constraint 
does not necessarily depend on adopting a causal account of knowledge. 
Rather, what is needed is an epistemological account that is able to 
integrate mathematical truths and thereby provide an explanation of 
how it is possible that mathematical truths, whose truth-conditions are 
spelled out using platonistic ontology (according to the the standard 
view of the semantic constraint), can be known to obtain by the sub 
ject.8 Rejecting the causal account does little to explain how such truth-
conditions can be reliably known to obtain. 
It is this stronger version of the Benacerraf dilemma – in the form of 
an integration problem – which will be the focus of the following sections. 
But, for clarity, I believe we should distinguish two requirements towards 
providing a fully integrated account. An epistemology for mathematics 
– which involves abstract objects – not only needs to explain how we 
know that the truth-conditions of a mathematical statement obtain, but, 
in addition, it also needs to explain how we can have (directed) beliefs 
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about the abstract ob jects that make the mathematical statements true. 
To put the point differently, it needs to explain how in thought we can 
have access or refer to ob jects that are not spatio-temporal.9 
This idea can be further explicated by considering the following passage 
of Hartry Field’s interpretation of the dilemma,10 which also dispenses 
with the purely causal constraint. He writes: 
“Benacerraf ’s challenge – or at least, the challenge which his 
paper suggests to me – is to provide an account of the mechanisms 
that explain how our beliefs about these remote entities can so 
well reflect the facts about them.” ((Field, 1980), p. 26)11 
Here, it seems to me, two issues are at hand in the challenge. The first 
issue is to explain how, in principle, we can successfully talk or have 
beliefs about abstract ob jects in the first place. The second issue is to 
explain, more specifically, how we are justified in thinking that those 
mathematical beliefs are true, or, as Field would put it, how those beliefs 
reliably track the mathematical facts. 
In conclusion to these considerations, I think we can now see that there 
are four separate requirements (the first two involved in the semantic 
constraint and the other two in the epistemological constraint) that 
collectively make up Benacerraf ’s dilemma and that collectively need 
to be addressed:
1. Homogeneous semantic theory 
The demand that we adopt a general and systematic theory of truth, 
which – for Benacerraf – should be a Tarskian Theory of truth. 
2. Surface-grammar 
The demand to respect the surface grammar of mathematical dis- 
course. 
3. Reference and object-directed thought 
The demand to explain how the ob jects posited by the semantic theory 
can, in principle, be in the range of directed thought and talk of the 
sub jects. 
4. Knowledge 
The ‘integration challenge’: The demand to reconcile the truths of the 
sub ject matter with what can be known by ordinary human thinkers. 
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Crucial here is to provide an explanation of how a sub ject can have 
mathematical knowledge and on what basis the sub ject can claim such 
knowledge. 
2 Strategies to resolve Benacerraf ’s dilemma
In this section I will review four different strategies to resolve 
Benacerraf’s dilemma. I will begin with a version of platonism which 
regards mathematical knowledge as a special kind of knowledge that 
has its own special source and so is distinct in kind from knowledge of 
other sub ject matters.
2.1 Intuitive platonism
Intuitive platonism adopts the standard view of the semantic constraint, 
conceiving of the mathematical language as referring to self-subsistent, 
abstract mathematical entities, and also respects the surface-grammar of 
the mathematical discourse. Our knowledge of such ‘remote’ entities is 
explained by the fact that in the case of mathematics we are concerned 
with a special type of knowledge, which in the relevant respect is basic. 
The idea here is to break with the demand that a general ly applicable 
account of knowledge is needed for every discourse. Instead, the axioms 
of mathematics and the rules of inference – from which the theorems 
of mathematics are derived – are regarded as basic in the sense that 
they cannot be inferred from, and so be known in virtue of, even more 
fundamental principles. Rather, a subject’s non-inferential knowledge of 
the axioms and the rules of inference has its source in the special faculty 
of intution, which, similar to the faculty of perception, provides direct 
knowledge of the truth of the basic axioms.
The main proponents of intuitive platonism within the philosophy of 
mathematics have been Kurt Godel and more recently Charles Parsons12. 
To characterise this type of platonism more precisely, the following often-
cited quotation from Godel highlights the role intuition is supposed to 
play here: 
“But despite their remoteness from sense-experience, we do have 
something like a perception of the ob jects of set theory, as is seen 
from the fact that the axioms force themselves upon us as being 
true. I don’t see any reason why we should have less confidence 
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in this kind of perception, i.e. mathematical intuition, than in 
sense-perception.” (G ̈odel, 1947), p.483-4
This version of platonism, however, faces various difficulties in providing 
a satisfactory answer to the two epistemic requirements in Benacerraf ’s 
dilemma. For one thing, note the transition in this quotation from 
knowledge of objects (“the ob jects of set theory”) with which 
mathematical intuition is concerned to knowledge of the truths of 
axioms (“the axioms force them selves on us”) which G ̈odel aims to 
underwrite by the faculty of intuition. Leaving aside what underwrites 
this transition, it remains unclear what the mark of a successful intuitive 
grasp of such an abstract ob ject is. Just claiming that we can perceive 
these ob jects and thereby regard the mathematical axioms as intuitively 
compelling, obvious, or as somehow “forcing themselves upon us”, 
seems insufficient as a genuine justification of our cognitive beliefs in 
the truth of the mathematical axioms. 
To highlight this further, consider in analogy the scenario in which we 
postulate a faculty of “perceiving other minds” which provides immediate 
knowledge of other minds and thereby accounts for the obviousness or 
intuitive compellingness of certain beliefs about them. No-one (in their 
right mind) would regard this as a sufficient explanation and justification 
of our beliefs about other minds. 
Also, and connected to this weakness, intuitive platonism has to be able 
to account for the fal libility of this faculty. It would be insufficient to say 
that Frege’s faculty of intuition did let him down when he postulated 
Basic Law V as an axiom, without explaining why it did and why it does 
not in other cases where the target statements are consistent.13
Various additional concerns could be raised but what seems to be at the 
heart of most criticisms14 is that a postulated faculty of intuition fails to 
provide a genuine explanation of our access to and knowledge of abstract 
entities, since it is just built into the faculty of intuition – as a brute fact 
– that it does enable such access and knowledge. Hence, crudely put, 
this type of platonism seems more like an acknowledgement of the 
inability to provide an explanation of our knowledge of mathematics 
than a genuine solution.15 
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In addition, the intuitive platonist also runs the risk of dislocating our 
mathematical knowledge from everyday and, more crucially, scientific 
knowledge. How on this view is mathematical knowledge embedded 
and interactive within the scientific corpus of knowledge? It is this 
version of the well-known application problem, which concerns how 
mathematical knowledge is applicable in empirical science, that proves 
especially challenging for the intuitive platonist. And exactly at this 
point is where a new type of platonism can be located, one which rejects 
both the view that mathematics has it’s own epistemology, and that it 
gives rise to a special sort of a priori knowledge. 
2.2 Naturalised platonism
Naturalised platonism, whose principal author is Quine16 , regards 
mathematical knowledge as being on a par with scientific knowledge. So, 
mathematical knowledge is part of our theoretical knowledge, just like 
knowledge of physics or chemistry, and the ob jects of mathematics are 
theoretical objects just like electrons, neutrinos or strings are theoretical 
ob jects posited by the physical theories. Therefore, there is neither the 
need for a special faculty of intuition to explain mathematical knowledge 
nor does mathematical knowledge enjoy a special status – as a type of a 
priori knowledge.
But, crucially, then how does the naturalised platonist explain mathe- 
matical knowledge, even if it is merely theoretical? After all, this version 
of platonism also adopts a Tarskian semantic theory to comply with the 
semantic constraint of Benacerraf ’s dilemma and, so, regards the objects 
of mathematics as abstract ob jects. 
This integration challenge has received an answer by the naturalised 
platonist in the form of the now well-known Quine-Putnam 
indispensability argument.1 The argument can be presented as 
follows:
Premise 1: Mathematics is indispensable to our scientific theories, in that 
they can neither be formulated nor practised without mathematical 
vocabulary and inferences. 
What mathematical knowledge could not be 55
Premise 2: If mathematics is indispensable to our accepted scientific 
theories, then if those scientific theories are true then the mathematics 
involved in scientific theorising is true.
Intermediate Conclusion 1: If scientific theories are true then the 
mathematics involved in scientific theorising is true. 
Premise 3: Scientific theories are true.
Intermediate Conclusion 2: The mathematics involved in scientific 
theorising is true. 
Premise 4: If mathematics is true, then there are the abstract entities to 
which it purportedly refers, such as numbers, functions, sets.
Conclusion: Abstract entities, such as numbers, functions and sets that are 
appealed to in mathematical theories which are involved in scientific 
theorising, exist.
It is in virtue of these pragmatic considerations that the naturalised pla- 
tonist aims to incorporate his platonist conception of mathematics within 
a naturalised epistemology, whereby all knowledge is merely empirical. 
Obviously crucial here is that mathematics actually is indispensable to 
science in the relevant respect – a claim that has been challenged by Field, 
and which will be discussed in the next section. But even granting that 
mathematics is indispensable, two issues remain: Firstly, is a conception 
for which every statement is empirical and as such “up for revision” 
stable and, secondly, if it is stable, how exactly do these pragmatic 
considerations resolve the two epistemic challenges? 
The first question has received much discussion in recent years. (Wright, 
16) argues that a Quinean position – which is a form of global 
empiricism – is intrinsically incoherent. The argument itself is very 
intricate and I don’t propose to discuss it here. The second question, 
however, is more pertinent to the current discussion and concerns the 
adequacy of the naturalised platonist answers to the epistemological 
issues about our knowledge of mathematical ob jects. 
Just like the intuitive platonist, the naturalised platonist does not pro- 
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vide much in terms of an explanation of our access to, or knowledge of, 
abstract ob jects. The indispensability argument might at best provide an 
argument that we are justified in thinking that there are abstract objects 
conceived of as theoretical entities. However, note that on this perspective 
a plausible element of mathematical thinking is lost. As Frege noted, 
“in arithmetic we are concerned with ob jects that we come to know 
not as something alien, from without through the medium of the sense, 
rather they are directly posited to reason, which, as its nearest kin, it 
can completely grasp.” ((Frege, 1884), §105 my translation) Hence, the 
“charm” of mathematics as “the reason’s proper study” is lost from a 
naturalised platonist perspective, as knowledge of mathematics and 
knowledge of the ob jects of mathematics is merely justified indirectly 
by its involvement in scientific theories that are true. 
Moreover, it is worth noting that knowledge of mathematics is parasitic 
upon (global) scientific realism (premise three) which is needed to 
arrive at the conclusion that mathematics is true. And, even granting 
the soundness of the indispensability argument, only a small part 
of mathematics will be justified by its application in science and thus 
the line between applied and pure mathematics becomes of crucial 
epistemological significance, since only the former, and not the latter 
(provided the above indispensability argument is all we have), can be 
justifiably regarded as true.18 
Thus, one misgiving about naturalised platonism is that, even granting 
for the moment that the indispensability explains how a sub ject can 
have knowledge of parts of mathematics, this position is failing to 
address Benacerraf ’s dilemma in full generality. The challenge is how 
mathematics in general can be integrated into a thinker’s corpus of 
knowledge, and not how some parts can be so integrated. So, I think 
a position that aims to explain all of mathematics and so tackles 
Benacerraf ’s dilemma in full generality is what is needed and desirable. 
Also, I find it hard to regard the indispensability of mathematics as an 
adequate explanation of our knowledge of mathematical entities and 
mathematical statements. Appealing to the need for mathematics in a 
presumably truth-apt scientific discourse does not – so at least it seems 
to me – provide the right type explanation of a thinker’s access to and 
knowledge of mathematical entities. Lastly and rather worringly, the 
What mathematical knowledge could not be 5
very idea that mathematics is indispensable to science is challengeable 
(and we shall review this challenge to naturalised platonism in the next 
section). Therefore, I think that these misgivings raise serious doubts 
as to whether the naturalised platonist position provides an adequate 
response to Benacerraf ’s dilemma. 
To summarise, both intuitive and naturalised platonist positions suffer 
from an inability to provide satisfactory answers to the epistemic issues 
of Benacerraf ’s dilemma. Both adopt the standard view to comply with 
the semantic constraint, yet they fail to account for the epistemological 
challenges. These failures can be regarded as motivating two alternative 
positions next to be discussed. The first, error-theoretic nominalism, aims 
to avoid the problematic ontology, without thereby rejecting the standard 
view in semantics, by claiming that mathematics, taken at face-value, is 
actually false. This conception is – in some respects – in the tradition of 
naturalised platonism in that it regards all knowledge as theoretical, if 
it exists at all, but rejects the indispensability of mathematics to science, 
thereby leaving no possible theoretical reason to accept mathematical 
entities in the first place. The second conception I shall call reconstructive 
nominalism. It also accepts a Tarskian account, but regards the surface-
grammar of the mathematical discourse as misleading. Mathematical 
ontology, accordingly, is not what it seems to be. 
2.3 Error-theoretic nominalism
This strategy is famously proposed and explored by Hartry Field in 
several of his writings.1 It can be motivated as a reply to the naturalised 
pla tonist who, according to the nominalist, has not gone far enough. 
What motivated naturalised platonism was the idea that we only have 
theoretical, i.e. empirical knowledge and thus no additional faculty 
has to be appealed to in order to account for mathematical knowledge. 
The error-theoretic nominalist adopts the main feature of naturalised 
platonism – that there is only empirical knowledge – while additionally 
avoiding any commitments to abstract entities whose knowledge is hard 
to explain. 
As the naturalised platonist conception was characterised above, the 
only reason it provides for thinking that there are numbers, sets, etc is 
the previously outlined indispensability argument. Field regards this a 
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valid argument but denies its soundness by rejecting the first premise 
– the claim that mathematics is indispensable to science. Crucially, Field 
works with an understanding of the underlying notion of indispensability 
which has to do not merely with the expressive resources gained by 
using mathematics, but also with the fact that mathematics is essential 
in establishing (proving) theorems and making predictions. Hence, to 
undermine the indispensability of current mathematical theory, it needs 
to be shown that there is an alternative theory that does equally well 
in establishing theorems and making predictions, but which does not 
involve commitments to numbers, sets, etc.
Field attempts exactly this and provides a framework that, according to 
him, does equally well, but that makes (arguably) no reference to abstract 
objects.20 Consequently, Field rejects the indispensability argument 
and with it he rejects what the regards as the only good motivation to 
believe in abstract ob jects. Hence, he adopts an error-theory for standard 
mathematics in that, taken at face-value, mathematics is false since it has 
ontological commitments to things that we have no reason to believe 
exist.21 Nevertheless, he thinks that we are still entitled to use a false 
theory and that it is desirable to do so since it is simpler and helps to 
“speed up inferences” so long as it is conservative. The relevant notion 
of conservativeness is the following:
Field’s notion of conservativeness
“A mathematical theory M is conservative iff for any assertion 
A about the physical world and any body N of such assertions, A 
doesn’t follow from N + M, unless it follows from N alone.”((Field, 
12), p. 5) 
The idea is that if mathematics is conservative, it is acceptable to use 
mathematics since it won’t lead to any conclusions that could not be 
arrived at without mathematics. So, mathematics can be used to “speed-
up” inferences or, in general, to make life easier for scientists without 
the need to endorse its truth and thereby its ontological commitments. 
Consequently, the basic notion for the error-theoretic nominalist is 
conservativeness and his credo is that “a mathematical theory must be 
conservative but need not be true”.22 
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As can be expected of such a radical view, there is an extensive literature 
on Field’s approach23 that I won’t attempt to survey here. Rather I will 
assess how such an account would resolve Benacerraf ’s dilemma, 
assuming the more specific criticisms are resolved. 
In some respects, Field’s resolution of the dilemma is simple but radical: 
We are misled in thinking that mathematics is true – quite the opposite, 
it is false. Still it is valuable because it is conservative (or at least parts 
of it are). Just like the two types of platonism above, the error-theoretic 
nominalist adopts the standard view to address the semantic constraint. 
He adopts a Tarskian theory of truth and he respects the surface grammar 
– but denies the truth of the mathematical discourse, while granting its 
usefulness cashed out in terms of conservativeness. So, provided error-
theoretic nominalism can overcome various technical difficulties in 
order to account for enough science, consistent with maintaining that 
mathematics is false but conservative, this position aims to overcome 
Benacerraf ’s dilemma by a radical route: denying mathematical 
knowledge altogether. Moreover, there is no need to account for a 
thinker’s reference to and ob ject-directed thought about mathematical 
entities. 
However, is this a promising strategy to resolve Benacerraf ’s dilemma? 
I don’t think so. A satisfying solution to the dilemma should not consist 
in giving up the basic assumption that we have mathematical knowledge. 
In a similar vein to my criticism to naturalised platonism, I think what 
is needed is a direct solution – taking Benacerraf ’s challenge head on – 
and integrate mathematical knowledge in general. Error-theoretic 
nominalism, in contrast, merely acknowledges defeat by dropping 
Benacerraf ’s main assumption that mathematical knowledge “is no less 
knowledge for being mathematical” (p.409). In turn, it seeks to explain 
why, in spite of there being no mathematical knowledge, we can pursue 
mathematics without a bad conscience. So, I think, in the context of a 
resolution to Benacerraf ’s dilemma, Field’s approach is a mere last resort. 
I will therefore, leave aside error-theoretic nominalism and continue 
to explore the possibility for a more suitable resolution of Benacerraf 
’s dilemma. Reconstructive nominalism is an alternative version of 
nominalism that shares the general scruples about abstract ob jects, but, 
less radically than Field, aims to retain the truth of mathematics, even if 
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it is not truth in virtue of the properties of numbers, sets, functions, etc. 
This strategy will be discussed in the next section. 
2.4 Reconstructive nominalism 
The reconstructive nominalist view can also be regarded as a response 
to naturalised platonism. Yet, it adopts a different strategy to avoid the 
problematic ontology, which seems to pose a serious problem for our 
knowledge of mathematics and so for a satisfying solution to Benacerraf’s 
dilemma. In contrast to error-theoretic nominalism that rejects the 
problematic ontology and the indispensability of mathematics, the 
reconstructive nominalist trades ontology for ideology. To explain, he 
rejects the following crucial move in the indispensability argument: 
Intermediate Conclusion 2: The mathematics involved in scientific the- 
orising is true. 
Premise 4: If Mathematics is true, then there are the abstract entities to 
which it purportedly refers, such as numbers, functions, sets.
Conclusion: Abstract entities, such as numbers, functions and sets that are 
appealed to in mathematical theories which are involved in scientific 
theorising, exist.
The reconstructive nominalist challenges premise four that the truth of 
mathematics commits one to the ob jects purported to be referred to by 
the mathematical terms. And to underwrite the motivation for rejecting 
this conditional, the reconstructive nominalist discards the second 
requirement of the semantic constraint, which involves the demand to 
take the surface-grammar of the mathematical discourse at face-value. 
Rejecting this assumption opens up the possibility of reconstructing 
mathematical discourse in various ways. One proponent of this strategy 
is Hellmann who adopts a version of Modal Structuralism 24 . The idea 
is to trade mathematical ontology – reference to numbers, sets, etc – for 
added ideology, namely the use of modal discourse. Mathematics is now 
conceived as concering possible structures (and ob jects). 
This conception is indeed a type of nominalism, as it refrains from 
reference to and quantification over existing abstract ob jects and instead 
merely commits one to possible entities. In the case of arithmetic, the 
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commitment is to a possible w-structure – a structure that exhibits 
the properties normally assigned to numbers and so makes the Peano 
axioms true.25 Various formal details need to be attended to, to make 
this reconstructive strategy work.26 Here, however, I will leave these 
formal issues aside and, just as above, note various difficulties with this 
approach and assess how it fares with regard to overcoming Benacerra’s 
dilemma. 
Reconstructive nominalism typically adopts Tarski’s theory of truth but 
denies the need to respect the surface grammar. Hence, such a conception 
denies the basic presumption that what seems to be referred to, or what 
seems to be thought about when doing mathematics, is what is referred 
to or thought about. According to reconstructive nominalism, there 
are no such ob jects as numbers underlying our mathematical thought 
and talk. We are systematically misguided in thinking that the surface 
grammar represents reality. To some, this might seem like a hard bullet 
to bite and, in general, I believe that an account which does respect the 
surface-grammar has advantages over a reconstructive account.
The important issue, however, is the epistemic constraint. The basic 
idea is that by avoiding the critical ontology (abstract ob jects) by 
appeal to possible structures, this type of reconstructive nominalism 
can overcome Benacerraf ’s dilemma. So, the thought had better be 
that knowledge of merely possible structures is easier explained and 
justified than knowledge of actual abstract ob jects. I think, however, 
that exactly this claim can be challenged.27 First, to clarify the modal 
structuralist position, it should be noted that the possible structures are 
structures of ob jects. For there to possibly be an w-structure to make the 
Peano axioms true, there have to be possibly infinitely many ob jects. 
Otherwise structures per se seem every bit as abstract as numbers, sets, 
etc. As a nominalist, Hellman should not be committed to the possible 
existence of infinitely many abstract ob jects because it would follow 
that it is contingent whether there are abstract objects – a curious 
contingency that needs to be explained.28 However, Hellman is aware 
of these difficulties and commits himself to the possibility of a concrete 
w-structure, i.e. that there could be infinitely many concrete ob jects 
(making up an w-structure).
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But, then how can one know this modal claim? What explains our 
knowledge, if we have it, that there could be infinitely many concrete ob- 
jects? One option is to argue from the mere conceivability of there being 
infinitely many concrete ob jects that it is possible that there are – but the 
extent to which conceivability is a good guide to possibility is a further 
issue. In general we can say that, just as in the case of abstract ob jects, a 
variant of Benacerraf ’s dilemma can be raised for the modal realm and 
the possible existence of certain ob jects.29 Unless it is clear that the latter 
type of knowledge – modal knowledge – is easier to explain and that the 
general scruples about abstract ob jects should be upheld, there are no 
advantages (but merely disadvantages based on added complexity and 
the rejection of surface-grammar) to such a reconstructive approach.30 
2.5 The fundamental assumption of the four strategies 
We have seen that apart from intuitive platonism, the other three 
strategies either truncate the knowledgeable part of mathematics, deny 
any mathematical knowledge, or turn mathematical knowledge into 
modal knowledge. 
Hence, these three strategies have not taken the dilemma head on; rather, 
they give up on basic components that gives rise to the dilemma. Con- 
sidering that neither these indirect responses nor the one direct response 
(intuitive platonism) offer a satisfying account to resolve Benacerraf 
epistemic constraints, I here want to explore whether there is an 
assumption that is shared by these four strategies. By identifying and 
then challenging it, we might be able to arrive at an alternative conception 
that holds the key to resolving Benacerraf ’s challenge. I think, that each 
strategy is committed to the following conditional, which I will label the 
fundamental assumption :
If there is a priori mathematical knowledge and the mathematical 
discourse is construed at face-value, then there has to be some 
form of acquaintance with the ob jects involved that underwrites 
this knowledge.
This assumption can reasonably explain why the intuitive platonist 
postulates a “perception-like” faculty – the faculty of intuition – which 
provides a form of acquaintance with the abstract ob jects. Having 
engaged in this (mysterious) interaction with the abstract ob jects 
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results, according to intuitive platonism, in a priori knowledge of the 
abstract ob jects and the relevant axioms purported to be about these 
ob jects. Naturalised platonism also accepts this conditional but, in 
contrast to intuitive platonism, denies that there can be a perception-like 
mathematical faculty or any other form of acquaintance with abstract 
ob jects, and accordingly denies that there can be any type of a priori 
knowledge of mathematics. As a result, there is a need to resort to 
broadly empirical and scientific considerations to explain mathematical 
knowledge. Both error-theoretic and reconstructive nominalism challenge 
the sufficiency of a broadly empirical epistemology of mathematics 
and both nominalist positions can also be interpreted as adopting the 
fundamental assumption. Error-theoretic nominalism adopts an even 
stronger assumption, namely that any type of knowledge has to involve 
some form of interaction or acquaintance, however indirect. Since 
there can be no such interaction with mathematical entities there is no 
mathematical knowledge in general. Reconstructive nominalism in 
contrast also accepts the truth of the fundamental assumption but then 
denies the component of the antecedent which claims that mathematics 
is to be construed at face-value. 
Reflecting on this assumption offers the opportunity to rethink the pla- 
tonist strategy. What exactly would be involved in rejecting the truth of 
the fundamental assumption? If it were rejected, it should be possible to 
have a priori knowledge of mathematics and the mathematical ob jects 
without having an acquaintance with the ob jects that mathematics is 
about. So, there is no need to account for an initial interaction with the 
sub ject-matter in order to found knowledge of that subject-matter. 
Thus a challenge of this subject-matter first idea would comprise the 
claim that a sub ject can have and justifiably claim knowledge of 
numbers without direct acquaintance as intuitive platonism demands 
and without resorting to purely pragmatic considerations which 
threaten a genuine explanation of mathematical knowledge. Instead, 
so the suggestion might go, we can have knowledge of numbers by 
reflecting upon statements about the ob jects in question – that is we 
can, in some sense, gain knowledge by linguistic competence and by 
mastering of the mathematical discourse. I think pursuing this new 
(fifth) strategy is definitely worth a try31 and some philosophers have 
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attempted to take this linguistic turn for our knowledge of mathematics, 
yet a proper discussion of this strategy will have to be postponed to 
another occasion.32 
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Notes
1. (Benacerraf, 13). 
2. See (Benacerraf, 1973) all unspecified references in this paper will be 
to the paper as published in (Benacerraf and Putnam, 13).
3. See for example (Goldman, 1967) or (Harman, 1973) as mentioned by 
Benacerraf. 
4. See especially (Hale and Wright, 2002) who distinguish these two 
issues. I draw on parts of their discussion of Benacerraf ’s dilemma. 
5. So a similar “Benacerraf ’s dilemma” can also be posed for ethical and 
modal discourse. 
6. Much more can be said about a Tarskian theory of truth, but the details 
are not important here.
7. This terminology was first introduced by (Peacocke, 1999) who 
himself refers to Benacerraf ’s dilemma as a prototype of the integration 
problem. 
8. Note that a solution to the integration problem need not start with a 
semantic theory as I do here. It is open to start with an epistemology and 
then aim to integrate a semantic theory within it. 
 The question of what our mathematical beliefs are about is underlying 
Benacerraf ’s earlier discussion in (Benacerraf, 165). 
10 See (Field, 1980) especially the introduction to this book, p. 20-30 
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11. Dialectically there is a difference between Field’s presentation and 
mine. He continues the above quote in the following way: “The idea is 
that if it appears in principle impossible to explain this, then that tends to 
undermine the belief in mathematical entities, despite whatever reason 
we might have for believing in them.” (op.cit.) I don’t think that this is 
how Bencacerraf ’s dilemma should be understood. I believe it is a 
genuine dilemma while Field regards it more or less as a challenge to 
the platonist. 
12. For example in (Parsons, 1979). 
13. Frege in his Grundgesetze der Arithmetik (Frege, 103) put forth 
Basic Law V and regarded it as a self-evident (logical) truth. Bertrand 
Russell showed in 1901 in a famous letter to Frege that his axiom is 
inconsistent. 
14. See for example (Hale and Wright, 2002) for extensive criticism of 
Parson’s and Godel’s views. 
15. There is however a recent resurrection of the idea of a faculty of 
intuition in current epistemology in the works of BonJour in his (BonJour, 
1) and (Sosa, 2005), which I won’t be able to cover here. 
16. See his (Quine, 16) but there are various others who hold similar 
positions, such as (Resnik, 1) and (Shapiro, 1).
17. Locus classicus is (Putnam, 1971). For an extensive discussion and 
recent defence of the indispensability argument, see (Colyvan, 2001).
18. There are further issues, for example how and if at all classical logic 
could be justified in virtue of application in science. See for example 
(Shapiro, 2005) for such discussion. 
19.See his (Field, 1989) and (Field, 1980). Chapter 2 of (Field, 1982) 
provides a non-technical introduction. 
20. Field is able to provide a theory without reference to mathematical ob 
jects that is able to capture Newtonian physics. Field’s theory, however, 
makes reference to space-time points that, some have argued, are best 
regarded as abstract entities. I won’t pursue this line of worry here. 
21. It can be challenged that this consideration suffices to establish an 
error-theory about mathematics. It seems rather that agnosticism should 
follow from this consideration. I will leave further discussion of this 
issue aside and grant that an error-theory about mathematics can be 
motivated in this way. 
22. (Field, 12), p. 5. 
23. A chronological collection of the most important literature is: 
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(Malamet, 12), (Shapiro, 13), (Shapiro, 14), (Hale, 1), as well 
as most of the papers in the collection (Irvine, 10). For a very detailed 
survey of Field and his critics consult (MacBride, 1) and for a detailed 
account and criticism of the technical framework see (Urquhart, 10), 
as well as (Burgess and Rosen, 1) who also provide a very nice 
reconstruction of the nominalism-platonism debate. For some replies 
(especially to Shapiro) see (Field, 15).
24. (Hellman, 1) 
25. On one reading of nominalism, namely Goodman’s and the early 
Quine’s, this approach would not be considered nominalistically 
acceptable. Compare: “Goodman and I got what we could get in the 
way of mathematics on the basis of a nominalist ontology and without 
assuming an infinite universe. We could not get enough to satisfy us. 
But we would not for a moment have considered enlisting the aid of 
modalities. The cure would have been far worse than the disease.” 
(reply to Charles Parson in (Hahn, 1986) as quoted from (Burgess and 
Rosen, 1), p. 24. I won’t here enter the dispute what is distinctive of 
nominalism, and continue to regard Hellman as a nominalist. 
26. For example providing the right type of translation from standard 
mathematics to modal statements, the problem of trivial conditionals, 
etc. For details see (Hellman, 1) and (Burgess and Rosen, 1). 
2. See especially (Hale, 16). 
28. This is a point made in Hale (Hale, 1996). Consult this paper for 
further discussion and explanation. 
2. See for an illuminating discussion (Stalnaker, 16). 
30. I have have to forgo discussion of other structuralist views, such as 
those of (Shapiro, 1) and (Resnik, 1), and the more pessimistic 
position which claims that there is no, or not just one solution, to the 
Benacerraf challenge, defended in (Azzouni, 14) and (Balaguer, 1) 
respectively. 
31. After all, it resulted in a PhD for the author of this paper.
32. Frege in his Grund lagen der Arithmetik ((Frege, 14)) has often 
been identified as the first proponent of this fifth strategy. The so-
called Neo-Fregeans are defending a view that is broadly in line with 
the fifth strategy. See especially (Wright, 1983), (Hale, 1987) and (Hale 
and Wright, 2001). It has been discussed and criticised extensively in 
recent literature, especially by Dummett (see his (Dummett, 11) and 
(Dummett, 1991)). An excellent survey article about Neo-Fregeanism 
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can be found in (MacBride, 2003). An up-to-date bibiography discussing 
many different issues of Neo-Fregeanism can be found on the Arche 
website: http://arche-wiki.st-and.ac.uk/ ahwiki/bin/view/Arche/
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